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ABSTRACT 
 
VERS L’EST: 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE DIPLOMATIC, GEOPOLITICAL AND SOCIO-POLITICAL 
FORCES SHAPING FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
(Under the direction of Dr. Gary Marks) 
 
The following discussion underlines the socio-political, geopolitical, and diplomatic factors 
that have directed, and continue to direct, French foreign policy in the Middle East.  Paris’s 
diplomatic positions concerning the Middle East region during first five presidencies of the 
Fifth Republic will be examined extensively, in addition to an analytical representation of the 
development of contemporary French foreign policy itself.  Furthermore, the electoral 
strength of French Jewish and Muslim communities, as well as the institutional realities of 
the Fifth Republic, will be investigated to exhibit which forces have yielded the most effect 
on Paris’s foreign policy framework.  This thesis ultimately argues that France’s approach 
towards the Middle East, as well as Paris’s overall “Arab” policy, stems from a geopolitical 
strategy that has, overall, remained remarkably continuous since the de Gaulle 
administration, and it has maneuvered relatively independently of economic and domestic 
socio-political forces.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In light of Paris’s steadfast resolve to drive diplomatic negotiations during recent 
crises in the Middle East, French foreign policy decisions during 2006 have once again 
ignited considerable debate within many Western and Middle Eastern circles concerning the 
exact “role” that France should play in the theatre.  Threatening the Middle East region with 
a potentially explosive political and military crisis, the Israel-Hezbollah-Lebanon conflict 
during the summer of 2006 elicited swift diplomatic mobilization in Western capitals, with 
Paris vehemently emphasizing its necessary central role in stabilizing the region.  French 
Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy reiterated France’s critical participation within the 
crisis, stating “The multipolar nature of the world has never been more obvious…. Naturally 
France is playing its role, in complement with its partners.”1
Citing its historical ties to the Middle East during the colonial era and its political 
access to nearly all actors involved in or affected by the crisis, including Lebanon, Israel, 
Hamas, and Hezbollah, Paris demanded French involvement within any international peace 
proposals.   During Security Council negotiations, Dominique Moisi emphasized that, “The 
French are in their historical role of representing the West vis-à-vis the most radical regimes 
 
1Katrin Bennhold and Dan Bilefsky. (2006). “Lebanon crisis puts France back in the diplomaticn 
spotlight.” International Herald Tribune, 7 August. 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/08/07/news/france.php 
 
2in the region…..And since the U.S. and Britain are very busy in Iraq and the Germans are 
reluctant to send troops, all eyes are turning towards France.”2
Following Chirac’s stringent refusal to endorse military intervention in Iraq during 
2003, in addition to recent violence within Parisian suburbs that highlighted the increasingly 
acrimonious relationship between Arab immigrant communities and the greater French 
population, the exact nature of the French Republic’s relationship to the Arab world is 
becoming ever more complicated.   Are domestic socio-political forces responsible for 
France’s contemporary orientation towards the Middle East and the greater Arab world? Is 
French policy connected to a broader geopolitical strategy?  Are traditional French policies 
facing necessary reform? 
 The following discussion consequently seeks to underline the socio-political, 
geopolitical, and diplomatic factors that have directed, and continue to direct, French foreign 
policy in the Middle East. An ideology stemming from the French Revolution and France’s 
historical cultural and political prominence on the European continent, the idea of France’s 
“mission civilisatrice” and its relationship to the development of French foreign policy will first 
be investigated in order to better understand Paris’s contemporary policies towards the Arab 
world.  Additionally, the preeminence of the French Executive within foreign and security 
policy will be examined to underscore the critical relationship between French Arab policy 
and the Constitutional realities of the Firth Republic.  Moreover, in order to exhibit the 
development and eventual reorientation of Paris’s Middle East policy since Israel’s 
establishment in 1948, the political and diplomatic decisions undertaken during the first five 
administrations of the French Firth Republic will be explored extensively.  Lastly, in a similar 
vein to the work of John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt concerning the Israeli lobby in the 
United States, the electoral role of Jewish and Muslim ethnoreligious lobbies in France will 
be investigated to emphasize their relevance to the foreign policy debate.   
 
2 Bennhold, 2006.   
3Key Arguments 
 This analysis ultimately argues that France’s approach towards the Middle East, as 
well as Paris’s overall “Arab” policy, stems from a geopolitical strategy that has remained 
remarkably continuous ever since the de Gaulle administration’s diplomatic reorientation 
concerning Middle East affairs during the 1960s, and has maneuvered relatively 
independently of economic and domestic socio-political forces.  Furthermore, the paramount 
role of the French Presidential Executive regarding the direction of foreign and security 
policy has proven critical to the continuation of de Gaulle’s ideological foundations.  While all 
five Presidents of the Fifth Republic have indeed pursued varying diplomatic policies 
towards the Middle East, each, buffered by Constitutional autonomy, has defended and 
more or less maintained the traditional Gaullist framework of a diplomatically independent 
France, particularly concerning the Arab world.  Nonetheless, the increasing economic and 
political segregation of France’s Muslim and Arab communities poses a serious threat to the 
stability of the French socio-political framework and could have considerable repercussions 
within France’s traditional foreign policy positions concerning the Middle East region. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF GAULLIST FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 
In Defense of La République 
In the aftermath of the diplomatic crisis between France and the United States 
concerning the Iraq War in 2003, scholars and politicians on both sides of the Atlantic 
attempted to understand the causes of the trans-Atlantic acrimony, focusing particularly on 
the contemporary nature of France’s diplomatic and foreign policy orientation.  Ardently 
defending the supremacy of international institutions such as the United Nations while at the 
same time blocking NATO efforts to secure the Turkish border, France bewildered political 
leaders within both the United States and Europe through its seemingly incongruous 
diplomatic positions.  Similar confusion has been directed towards French policies 
concerning the Middle East and the broader Arab world.  France is frequently categorized as 
pro-Arab, an accusation that has been emboldened due to increasing anti-Semitic attacks 
within France.  In reality, French diplomacy in the region is not “pro-Arab,” “anti-Semitic,” or 
“anti-American.”  Rather, French policy within the Middle East, and arguably every region of 
the world, has remained steadfastly rooted in the diplomatic, economic, and political 
interests of the French Republic itself. 
 
Une Mission Civilisatrice 
Similar to the United States, France argues that it has a unique role to play within the 
international geopolitical framework and a duty to proliferate its democratic values to all 
5areas of the world.  Buffered by the propagation across the European continent of France’s 
cultural achievements and political ideologies during the 18th and 19th centuries, French 
leaders on both the left and right entered the 20th century with a firm, collective belief in the 
nation’s mission civilisatrice, or duty to serve as a civilizing beacon to the world.3
Acknowledging this ideology, Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin stated, “At the 
heart of our national identity, there is a permanent search for values that might be shared by 
others.4” Consequently, a dedication to the defense of France’s “grandeur” and “rank” within 
the global arena has come to define French foreign policy.  Paul Gallis argues, 
“France’s rank and influence in the world are important to French 
policymakers….Membership in the UN, close relationships with parts of the Arab 
world and former worldwide colonies, aspects of power such as nuclear weapons, 
and evocation of humans rights are central to France’s self-identity within 
international affairs.”5
A multilateral, multipolar world 
Norman Bowen emphasizes that French foreign policy has remained noticeably 
consistent for nearly forty years, adhering to multilateralism, multipolarity, and regionalism.  
Declaring its steadfast allegiance to the United Nations Security Council during the buildup 
to the US invasion of Iraq, French representatives lambasted unilateralism and stressed the 
primacy of the UN in questions on international security.  French “deference” to the United 
Nations, in which it holds critical veto, has developed into a central policy platform to 
strengthen France’s international diplomatic strength, as it creates an international, legally 
endorsed venue from which to promote French interests.6
3 Paul Gallis. (2006). “France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and Issues in U.S.-French Relations.” 
Washington: Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, 19 May.  
 
4 Gallis, 2006.  
 
5 Gallis, 2006 
 
6 Norman Bowen. (2005). “Multilateralism, Multipolarity, and Regionalism: The French Foregin Policy 
Discourse.” Mediterranean Quarterly, 16 (1), 94-116.   
 
6Alongside defending the supremacy of the UN, France has continually refused any 
dominance of European security issues by the American-led North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and has defended its diplomatic and economic relationship with the 
Middle East despite increasing US intervention in the theatre.  Advocating multipolarity, 
French politicians on both the Left and Right have consistently expounded their image of 
international relations as an arena in which nation states compete against one another and 
regions work in tandem to strengthen their influence, such as the European Union.7
Challenges continue to hinder French multipolar policies, however, particularly due to the 
EU’s continued encroachment on France’s traditional role in post-War Europe, exacerbated 
by the French population’s rejection of the EU Constitution in May 2005 .  Dominique Moisi 
argues that France faces four critical challenges that threaten its traditional political and 
economic view of the world:  globalization, unipoloarity, continued European integration, and 
the immobility of its social-political and economic system.   
“Today France is torn more than ever between the desire to be a modern, normal 
country and the reflex to cling to the belief that France is not like other nations. The 
first choice presupposes openness, flexibility, and a secure sense of one's identity. 
The second opposes globalization, is wary of a more unified Europe, and embraces 
anti-Americanism.”8
Paramount role of the United Nations 
 Dedicated to retaining its Great Power status following World War II, French political 
leaders, led by Charles de Gaulle, vehemently sought a new international framework that 
would protect French sovereignty and ensure its diplomatic strength.  Originally refusing to 
co-sponsor any initiatives leading to the creation of the United Nations, due to its exclusion 
from the 1945 San Francisco Conference, France ultimately received an invitation to serve 
as a veto-holding member of the UN Security Council due to insistence by the British to 
 
7 Bowen, 2005.  
 
8 Dominique Moisi. (1998). “The Trouble with France.” Foreign Affairs, 77(3), 94-104. 
 
7have a fellow colonial power on the Council to counter the Soviet Union.9 Insisting that 
every member of the Council retain the right to defend its interests even in the face of 
Council disapproval, France, under the leadership of de Gaulle, immediately began a 
campaign to protect its exceptional status within both the Cold War and colonial framework, 
refusing at first to sever its ties with Lebanon, Africa, and Indochina.  France’s unique 
position in the post-War arena initially provided French leaders with a unique capability to 
proliferate its diplomatic and economic interests abroad while maneuvering between the two 
superpowers.  In a statement given to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1945, a French 
general stated that France must not modify the “useful equilibrium” created in the “absence 
of immediate danger for France resulting from the equilibrium between the two 
superpowers.”10 
Bowen emphasizes the French leaders during the 1950s remained considerably 
skeptical of the newly endorsed UN, particularly as the body removed France’s rights to its 
former League of Nations mandates in the Middle East.  Moreover, due to American action 
within the Security Council, the UN successfully thwarted the Franco-British-Israeli military 
intervention in 1956 to reclaim the Suez Canal from Egypt’s Nasser, furthering French 
concerns towards increasing American hegemony and the UN itself. 11 
Paris and NATO 
 Arguably one of the most important topics in any discussion of the development of 
contemporary French foreign policy, the relationship between France and NATO ultimately 
proved to be a critical representation of France’s ideological position within the worldwide 
 
9 Bowen, 2005.  
 
10 Bowen, 2005.  
 
11 Paul-Marie de la Gorce, Paul-Marie.  (1997). “Europe and the Arab-Israeli Conflict : A Survey.”  
Journal of Palestine Studies, 26(3), 5-16.   
 
8diplomatic, security, and political framework.  Having created its own nuclear deterrent, 
France leveraged its political and military capabilities to retain its power.  Wary of American 
dominance within NATO and its potential threat to French military sovereignty, de Gaulle 
withdrew France from the organization’s integrated military command in 1966, forcing US 
troops to leave French territory.12 De Gaulle’s action laid a geopolitical foundation that 
would define French foreign policy in the second half of the Twentieth century.   
 
A French “Third Way” 
 A considerably burdensome policy for many leaders in the United States and various 
European countries, French politicians have continually stressed the need for multipolarity in 
the contemporary global geopolitical framework.  Echoing de Gaulle’s “Third Way” tactics 
from the 1960s, in which France could enjoy a unique position between the two 
superpowers, French calls for multipolar divisions foster a sense of exceptionalism, due to 
the fact that it endows nations such as France with unique geopolitical maneuverability 
within international affairs.13 As defined by Dominique de Villepin during his tenure as 
Minster of Foreign Affairs, the French view of multipolarity involves an international 
framework in which “each large geographic region, each big power, and collectivity of states 
can assume together their responsibilities, with the UN being the grand symbol.”14 Michael 
Brenner and Guillaume Parmentier argue that France’s defense of multipolarity stems from 
a desire to curb the hyperpuissance of the United States through the creation of 
independent decision-making spheres, a further projection of European power, and a 
 
12 Bowen, 2005. 
 
13 Bowen, 2005. 
 
14 Bowen, 2005. 
 
9decrease in the political and diplomatic weight of the US in international organizations such 
as the WTO.15
France’s dedication to multipolarity faces considerable political weaknesses in light 
of Paris’s recent dedication towards the establishment of autonomous venues for European 
defense.  In a joint 2002 agreement with the British at St. Malo, France emphasized its 
desire for a European cadre within the NATO framework.   Dominique Moisi notes France’s 
contemporary geopolitical predicament, stating, “The only card with which France can 
challenge American hegemony is Europe, and to play it Paris must abandon much of its 
sovereignty.”16 Bowen further emphasizes the inherent contradiction, stating, 
“The emphasis on the Security Council marks a reaffirmation of France’s role as a 
Great Power with worldwide interests separate from Europe…At the UN, France and 
Britain speak for themselves; they have resisted any suggestion that their separate 
seats be combined into a single permanent EU seat on the Security Council or that 
they should speak for Europe as a whole.”17 
15 Bowen, 2005. 
 
16 Moisi, 1998.   
 
17 Bowen, 2005.  
 
CHAPTER III 
 
FOREIGN POLICY AND THE FRENCH EXECUTIVE 
Paramount to any analysis of French policy towards the Middle East and the greater 
Arab World is an examination of the constitutional role of the Executive within the French 
Firth Republic and its inextricable relationship to the execution of French foreign policy.   
Divergent from the American presidential system in the respect that the French executive is 
divided between an elected president and a prime minister dependent on legislative 
majority, France’s constitutional system nevertheless parallels the U.S. model in its 
allocation of considerable diplomatic power to the President.18 While a French president’s 
authority is reduced during periods of Cohabitation with a Prime Minister of a different party, 
his/her control of central foreign and security policy matters remains relatively autonomous 
from Parliamentary action.   In light of the instability associated with the Fourth Republic, 
which rendered the government unable to plan and execute long-term foreign policy 
objectives, Charles de Gaulle designed the Firth Republic to bolster the central authority of 
the Executive.19 Highlighting the considerable power afforded to the President, former 
French Prime Minister Pierre Messmer concluded that the Fifth Republic offers essentially 
no room for legislative debate or input concerning matters of foreign and security policy 
 
18 Tom Lansford and Robert J. Pauly, Jr. (2003).  “National Security and the Strong Exeuctive: The 
French and American Presidents and the War on Terror.”  American Diplomacy, May 20.  
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2003_04-
06/lansfordpauly_exec/lansfordpauly_exec.html 
 
19 Lansford, 2003. 
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because the President alone determines any final decision.20 In addition to the office’s 
authority to negotiate and ratify treaties, the President names French ambassadors and 
approves the candidacies of foreign ambassadors sent to Paris.21 When both the President 
and Parliament derive from the same political party, French presidential authority is one of 
the strongest within Western democracies, eliciting President Francois Mitterrand to suggest 
in 1964 that, “There are Ministers in France….It is even rumored that there is still a Prime 
Minister…but there is no longer a government… Only the President of the Republic orders 
and decides.”22 
Tom Lansford consequently argues that the office “[provides] the President with wide 
ranging powers, and successive presidents have used their position to pursue both partisan 
policies and to reinforce long standing traditions in the nation’s security policy.”23 These 
traditions, defined by an adherence to the grandeur and rank of France within the global 
geopolitical framework, have served as the foundation for French foreign policy in the Middle 
East.  Due to this inexorable authority of the French presidency concerning diplomacy, Paris 
has thus been able to remain quite active within Arab and Middle East geopolitical affairs, 
maneuvering autonomously from Parliament and consistently buffered by the Elysée 
Palace’s conviction that the France has an international “status and duty.” 24 
20 Lansford, 2003.   
 
21 Mark Kesselman, et al. (2005 ed.).  European Politics in Transition. New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Company. 
 
22 Lansford, 2003. 
 
23 Lansford, 2003. 
 
24 Lansford, 2003.   
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
PARIS AND THE MIDDLE EAST 
Immediate Post-War Framework 
Following the Second World War, France faced considerable difficulty in altering its 
traditional colonial policy and adamantly attempted to prevent the decolonization of its once 
vast empire.   Discussing the declining role of France in its former League of Nations 
Mandates in Syria and Lebanon during post-war foreign policy deliberations, Charles de 
Gaulle stated,  
“In the Middle East our affairs are at an all time low…The Algerian crisis and the 
Suez incident have closed off our access to the Arab States….Naturally I intend to 
reestablish our position in the region of the world, where France has always been 
active.”25 
Phillipe Rondot argues that de Gaulle’s initial impetus to reassert French interests in 
the region set the stage for a continuous French foreign policy discourse concerning the 
Middle East, one that would last nearly forty years, spanning four presidential 
administrations and define France’s controversial relationship to the volatile region.  
Emphasizing the increasing prevalence of the idea of France’s “grandeur” within de Gaulle’s 
administration in relation to the Middle East and the greater Arab region, Amir Taheri argues 
that the Gaullists, “haunted buy a desire to conduct policies on the basis of a ‘grand design’ 
and intuitively hostile to pragmatism….looked for what they hoped would be a large, solid, 
 
25 Phillipe Rondot. (1987). “France and Palestine: From Charles de Gaulle to Francois Mitterrand.” 
Journal of Palestine Studies, 16(3), 87-100. 
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and above all “historical’ frameworks for policy….Once such framework was la Politique 
Arabe de la France.” 26
At the onset, France served as an ardent defender of the newly created Israeli state, 
voting for its admission to the United Nations in 1949 and fought alongside Israeli soldiers 
during the Suez Crisis.  France also signaled a desire for stability in the region through its 
participation in the tripartite declaration alongside the United States and Britain calling for 
the preservation of the status quo in the Middle East.  Furthermore, in a move that would aid 
in establishing the foundations for Israeli military dominance in the region, France supplied 
the Jewish state with the majority of its military arms capabilities.27 
Charles de Gaulle and the advent of Gaullism 
Such policies, however, served to damage Franco-Arab relations across the Middle 
East region, which only worsened during the brutal Algerian War of Independence.   
Returning to power in 1958, Charles de Gaulle directed French diplomatic efforts towards 
reestablishing rapport with the Middle East.  In a move to regain allies in the Arab world, 
infuriating large segments of the French pied noir community in the process, de Gaulle 
allowed the French electorate to vote in a referendum on Algerian independence and 
subsequently extricated France from the diplomatic and military quagmire that engulfed 
French foreign policy throughout the 1950s.   Despite an increased rapprochement with the 
Arab world following this decision, de Gaulle did not confront the Palestinian question until 
1967, when he declared to Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban that “one consequence of the 
hostilities will be that the problem of Palestinian refugees will assume an international 
 
26 Amir Taheri. (2003). “France’s Arab Policy: Time for a Debate.” American Foreign Policy Interests, 
25, 323-336.   
 
27 Bowen, 2005. 
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dimension.”28 Additionally, in a clear criticism of Israeli mobilization before the Six Day War, 
de Gaulle issued a statement regarding France’s refusal to approve or support any nation 
that uses arms first.29 In a pivotal foreign policy maneuver, which raised eyebrows 
worldwide, he announced in November of 1967, “there were those who feared that the 
Jews, who through long years of dispersion had remained what they had always been – an 
elitist people, self assured and domineering, would, once gathered in the site of their former 
grandeur, transform into a burning drive for conquest.”30 De Gaulle thus effectively placed 
the Israeli military and diplomatic mobilization within an imperialistic context.  
Rondot argues that de Gaulle, in pressing for Israeli pre-war border recognition and 
developing connections with Arab nations in the region, essentially aimed to stabilize the 
Middle Eastern situation to the benefit of French involvement within the regional theatre.  
“France hoped to prevent the Palestinian question from being resolved at some new Yalta, 
where Washington and Moscow would reach an agreement at the expense of those 
involved, as was their wont.”31 Edwards Kolodziej emphasizes that de Gaulle’s polices 
towards Israel and its Arab neighbors during the 1960s stemmed from a broader 
Mediterranean policy that, in line with Gaullist doctrine, aimed to stymie any encroachment 
by the superpowers within the historically Francophone Arab region.32 Desiring the 
dissolution of the two-bloc international framework, de Gaulle pursued bilateral diplomatic 
and economic relations with all members of the two “imperial” systems, while also 
recognizing that no peaceful resolution could develop within the Middle East without Soviet 
 
28 Bowen, 2005. 
 
29 Rondot, 1987. 
 
30 Rondot, 1987, 
 
31 Rondot, 1987. 
 
32 Edward A. Kolodziej. (1971). “French Mediterranean Policy: The Politics of Weakness.” 
International Affairs, 47(3), 503-517. 
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acquiescence.33 Any confrontation with the Soviet Union, and the United States for that 
matter, would undermine de Gaulle’s Cold War “Third Way” policy of détente.  At the same 
time, increasing hostilities within the region could have easily encouraged greater American 
and Soviet intervention, thereby suffocating French involvement in the region.34 Kolodziej 
argues that de Gaulle’s actions developed from fears that, 
“…the eastern Mediterranean struggle would inevitably spill over into the Magreb, 
France’s  sphere of influence, and threaten to spread into Black francophone 
Africa….Siding with Israel would also snuff out emerging French efforts to improve 
relations in the Middle East from which it had been excluded since World War II.”35 
The Pompidou Administration 
Upon his arrival to the Elysée in 1968, Pompidou continued de Gaulle’s initiative to 
protect French independence concerning foreign affairs and further pressed for global 
recognition of the Palestinian situation.  Defending French interests in the region, in addition 
to the right and duty of France to play a significant role, he emphasized that France “owes it 
to herself to defend her moral and material interests – which are considerable and diverse in 
the entire Mediterranean region – particularly her longstanding an renewed ties with the 
Arab States – our policy is, and has always been, to counsel prudence whenever 
possible.”36 Paris stressed the need for a concrete resolution to the Palestinian problem, and 
its policies quickly earned France considerable favor in the majority of the Arab world.  
Muslims across the Middle East and North Africa showed significant unity in their opinion of 
 
33 Kolodziej, 1971. 
 
34 Kolodziej, 1971. 
 
35 Kolodziej, 1971. 
 
36 Rondot, 1987. 
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France, viewing it as the only power in the Security Council that utilized its veto in favor of 
Arab interests. 37
Valery Giscard D’Estaing 
Valery Giscard D’Estaing continued the same diplomatic policy framework of his 
predecessors and based his position on Arab interest on two principles.  First, France would 
continue to promote dialogue among all parties involved in the Middle East, and second 
France would pursue a bilateral policy of “friendship and cooperation” with Arab states.38 
Eliciting considerable concern from Israel and other Western nations, Gisard supported a 
1974 UN resolution inviting Yasser Arafat to be present at UN debates over the Palestinian 
situation.39 Meeting Arafat in the same year, French foreign minister Jean Sauvagnargues 
reiterated France’s dedication to reducing terrorism in Palestine and to ensuring the right of 
all states in the Middle East to exist within their own borders.  Arafat, while not embracing all 
of the French demands, declared that the visit emphasized “France’s attachment to justice 
and the national rights of the Palestinians.”40 Rondot notes that, ironically, French-PLO 
rapprochement continued throughout the decade, even in the midst of Palestinian terror 
attacks on French soil.   Paris’s relationship with Jerusalem further deteriorated in 1980 
when Giscard declared the Palestinian right to self determination, and numerous nations 
within the EEC acted in solidarity with the French position, including West Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and Italy.  Not only did EEC support give France a stronger foundation 
from which to bargain, but it also offered the Elysée Palace an edge in countering American 
 
37 Rondot, 1987. 
 
38 Rondot, 1987. 
 
39 Rondot, 1987. 
 
40 Rondot, 1987. 
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diplomacy that increasingly emphasized bilateral agreements rather than an EEC-endorsed 
comprehensive, regional peace process.41 Collectively expressing the EEC’s demand for 
PLO participation in the negotiation process, the 1980 Venice Declaration at the European 
Council conveyed Europe’s conviction for mutual recognition by the Israeli and Palestinians 
communities of the other’s right to exist.  Israeli leaders balked at the concept and feared 
the UK would soon be pulled with France’s increasingly pro-Arab wake.42
Francois Mitterrand and the Socialist Revolution 
Entering office in 1981, Francois Mitterrand commenced a Middle East platform that 
initially appeared divergent from his predecessors, due to a considerable portion of the 
French Left supporting the Zionist socialist ideology exhibited by the party’s pioneers.  
Gaullist diplomatic undertones nevertheless defined his foreign policy towards the region.43 
While determined not to jeopardize French-Arab relations, Mitterrand believed that his 
predecessors had pursued a Middle East policy that had compromised French-Israeli 
relations.44 Paul-Marie de la Gorce emphasizes that Mitterrand “believed that only by 
calibrating French policy via better and even intimate relations with Israel’s leaders might he 
be able to contribute to a peace settle by convincing them to accept a fair settlement of the 
Palestinian question.”45 Israel’s 1981 strike on a French-built nuclear reactor in Iraq 
received no condemnation from the Elysée Palace, and the Israeli bombing of Beirut during 
the same year received a similar muted reaction.  Rondot argues that “new French policy in 
 
41 Rondot, 1987. 
 
42 Rondot, 1987. 
 
43 Rondot, 1987. 
 
44 Gorce, 1997. 
 
45 Gorce, 1997. 
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the Middle East could be characterized, in its early stages, by a desire to humor Israel while 
keeping open the channels for dialogue with the Palestinians.”46
Although Mitterrand’s policies did not involve the full demands of the Venice 
Declaration, his insistence on the right of the Palestinians to obtain a “state” went 
considerably further than Giscard’s requests for a Palestinian “homeland,” prompting 
considerable denunciation by Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin.47 French censure of 
Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, combined with France’s help in evacuating Palestinian 
fighters from Beirut, further strengthened French-Palestinian relations, culminating in a 
message sent to Mitterrand from Arafat, declaring, “From the rank of a friend, France has 
now become a brother.” 48 
Jacques Chirac and the Middle East 
 Breaking with Mitterrand’s more staid involvement within the Middle East region, the 
Presidency of Jacques Chirac has elicited one of the most dynamic and controversial 
episodes in France’s historical relationship with both Israel and the Arab world.  Taheri 
argues that Chirac’s “Arab” policy is driven neither out of kinship with Arab leaders such as 
Saddam Hussein, as many Americans leaders claimed during the 2003 Iraq War debates, 
nor out of overwhelming economic interests in the region.49 Rather, Chirac’s vision is 
inextricably connected to de Gaulle’s foreign policy legacy that insists on France’s necessity 
for a Mediterranean “profondeur” to counter Germany weight in the EEC and the trans-
 
46 Rondot, 1987. 
 
47 Rondot, 1987. 
 
48 Rondot, 1987. 
 
49 Taheri, 2003. 
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Atlantic Anglo-American axis.  For Chirac, such profondeur, in practice, requires a “special 
relationship” with Arab States in the Magreb and the Middle East region. 50
Only months into his first seven-year presidency, Chirac had already invited over a 
dozen Arab government leaders to the Elysée Palace, attended the “peacemakers summit” 
in Sharm el-Shaikh, Egpyt, and paid state visits to numerous Middle Eastern capitals.  
During a highly publicized trip to Jerusalem, Chirac actions incited considerable political 
controversy within Israel, setting the tone for his Middle East policy.   Prevented by Israeli 
security from having direct contact with the Palestinian population during his tour of Old 
Jerusalem, Chirac declared, “This is not security; this is pure provocation, what do you want 
me to do? Fly back right away to Paris?”51 Emphasizing France’s role within the regional 
crisis, Chirac stated after the event, “People have to get used to our renewed presence, 
especially in this part of the world….We have interests and ideas and are determined to be 
seen and heard.”52 
A symbolic gesture of resistance to Israel, Chirac’s actions in Jerusalem immediately 
bolstered his reputation across the Middle East region as a friend to Arab interests.  Olivier 
Guitta argues, “Chirac appeared, in the eyes of Arab opinion, to be the only Western leader 
that could counter the unconditional support of the United States to Israel.... [and] became 
more popular than certain leaders or kings in the Arab capitals.”53 
Chirac’s relationships with Saddam Hussein and Yasser Arafat further deteriorated 
French-Israeli relations and elicited considerable concern in Washington.  France lobbied 
the UN to reduce sanctions against Hussein, who had enjoyed a personal relationship with 
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Chirac since the 1970s, and supported the inauguration of the UN Oil for Food Program in 
1996 which benefited Iraq.54 Arguably rewarding France and Chirac for its efforts, Iraq 
bolstered trade between the two nations, and by the late 1990s France served as Iraq’s 
chief trading partner.  Nonetheless, the Franco-Iraqi economic realities in 2003 easily 
negate accusations that Chirac’s diplomatic derived from significant commercial 
motivations.  Exports and imports to/from Iraq represented less than 0.3% of France’s total 
trade, and economic sanctions prevented any realization of French oil company contracts so 
long as Hussein remained in power.55 Justin Vaisse argued in 2003, “If commercial interests 
were the main factor driving policy, the appropriate strategy for France…would be to back 
the U.S., to join the coalition, and insist on a share of the spoils, including debt repayment 
and the honoring of oil contracts.”56 Economic interests undoubtedly proved secondary to 
Chirac’s geopolitical and diplomatic strategy in the region.   
Lambasting Israel’s isolation of Arafat, Chirac stated at the 2004 NATO Summit, 
“Arafat is probably the only person capable of imposing on the Palestinian people 
compromises, particularly of a territorial nature, which could not be imposed, today at any 
rate, by anyone else…This is why I believe that wanting to isolate him isn’t very prudent or 
very much in line with a strategy of restoring peace.”57 Commenting on Arafat’s medical 
stay in Paris during the final days of his life, Le Figaro stated that Paris literally turned into 
the capital of Palestine.58 
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France’s contemporary relationship with Hezbollah has also been controversial, 
particularly in light of recent military action between the organization and Israel during the 
summer of 2006, as well as Hezbollah’s alleged role in the 1983 Beirut bombings that killed 
58 French servicemen.  Describing Hezbollah as a “social” organization, France has resisted 
policies from Washington aiming to label the group as a terrorist organization, and invited 
Hezbollah Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah to a 2002 Francophone Summit in Beirut.59
Olivier Guitta argues that Chirac’s policy has considerably advanced French perception 
within Muslim quarters of Lebanon that have been more sympathetic to Hezbollah’s cause.  
Nasrallah noted in an April 2005 that his organization embraced France’s role in the region, 
stating that the "Lebanese do not like to see France held hostage to the savage and 
aggressive American hegemony."60 
The Chirac administration also continued Gaullist policy concerning Syria, and 
Chirac echoed de Gaulle’s previous statements on the “indestructible friendship” shared 
between the two nations.61 He was the only Western head of state to attend Hafez al-
Assad’s funeral in 2000 and has actively developed a relationship with his son, Bashar al-
Assad, the current President of Syria.  Relations strained, however, during 2004, when Paris 
joined Washington in supporting U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559 demanding Syrian 
military withdrawal from Lebanon.  Various theories developed concerning French support 
for Lebanon, with the left-wing French paper La Liberation stating that Chirac’s extremely 
close relationship with assassinated Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri forced him to 
choose between France’s Arab allies.62 Nonetheless, France continues to invest human 
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and infrastructural capital into Syria, which BBC Correspondent Allan Little connects to the 
remnants of both France’s “mission civilisatrice” and Gaullism that are directing the Chirac 
administration.   
“America wants to topple anti-western dictators; France wants to work with them in 
the hope that they will become less anti-western. America believes it can introduce 
democracy to the Arab world; France is pleased when it manages to introduce ATMs 
to its banking system. Each - in separate ways - is trying to re-shape the Arab world 
in its own image - and bend the Arab world to its own needs.”63
63 Alan Little. (2004). France and Syria: A Tangled History.  BBC, 7 September.  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3635650.stm 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
SOCIO-POLITICAL DOMESTIC FORCES 
Inciting widespread political and academic backlash within the United States in the 
spring of 2006 following the British publication of their joint-authored article entitled “The 
Israel Lobby,” renowned political scientists John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt explored 
the US-Israel relationship in an effort to shed light on the socio-political and geopolitical 
forces driving American policy in the Middle East region.64 Considering France’s 
longstanding involvement within the Middle East, one could easily surmise that domestic 
factors have served to drive Paris’s policies in a similar fashion.  Through examining, 
however, the social-political and electoral power of ethnoreligious Jewish and Muslim 
communities within metropolitan France, one discovers, in fact, the opposite.  
 
Immigration 
Viewed as contradictory to the idea of “France One and Indivisible,” the socio-
political status of ethnic minorities has traditionally been avoided by the French political 
elite.  In line with Jacobin ideology, the French state defines itself by citizens rather than 
communities.   The French High Council on Integration, proclaiming its dedication to  
process not assimilation, advocated that France, “maintain a doctrine of equality between 
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individuals, which is in France’s tradition, principle, and genius, and it goes further in the 
fulfillment of the individual rights rather than the acknowledgement of minority rights, the 
value of which is not to be underestimated.”65
Nevertheless, whether leaders prefer to admit it or not, France is a multiracial and 
pluri-ethnic society, due to years of immigration from both its former colonies and other EU 
nations. Immigration and its consequent effects on the socio-political framework of French 
society is inextricably connected to any analysis of France’s role in the Middle East, as it 
underlines the role that ethno-religious forces currently serve in defining certain French 
policy decisions.   Political scientist John Keeler argues that the once ignored electoral 
strength of ethnoreligious groups such as Jews and Muslims is slowly gaining the attention 
of the French political establishment and may develop into a critical factor concerning 
contemporary French foreign policy concerning the Middle East.66 
The number of foreigners living within French territory currently approaches 9.8 
million, representing approximately 15% of the population.  While significant numbers of 
Italian, Spanish, and other European nationalities are included in this figure, by far the 
largest proportion of foreigners in France stems from its former colonies in Africa and Asia, 
as 30,1% are from North Africa, 9,1% from the rest of Africa, and 12,6% from Asia.67 French 
colonial expansion during the late 19th century laid the framework for continued streams of 
movement between metropolitan France and its colonies.68 Following crippling losses to its 
available working population after two world wars, France initially looked to foreign labor 
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from neighboring European nations to fill the void and initiated guest worker programs with 
nationals from Belgium, Italy, and Spain.69 Decolonization movements within Algeria and 
other colonies led to significant immigrant waves from non-EEC countries throughout the 
1950s and 1960s, and the number of “French Muslims” from the Magreb region living in 
Metropolitan France climbed from 350,000 in 1962 to 470,000 by 1968.70
Coupled with the maturation of the baby boom generation, economic crises during 
the 1970s put an abrupt halt to labor migration programs in an effort to curb increasing 
French unemployment rates, and the French government officially suspended legal 
immigration in 1974.71 Immigration continued nonetheless, as waves of family members 
arrived from across the world to join relatives living and working in France, creating 
contentious socio-political debates concerning how to best approach immigration and social 
integration in the face of a stagnating economy.  Restrictive policies were put in place during 
the 1970s and remained a policy priority until the electoral victory of Socialists in 1981.72 
Defending restriction, then Prime Minister Jacques Chirac claimed, “A country that as 
900,000 unemployed people but more than 2 million immigrant workers is not a country 
where the unemployment problem is insoluble.”73 
Scholars and political analysts alike have faced a substantial barrier regarding how 
to analyze and approach immigration in the French context due to strict rules concerning 
census management and minority policy.  In contrast to the Anglo-Saxon multicultural 
method, France equates citizenship with equal treatment and does not count racial and 
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ethnic groups. Legislation dating from 1978 forbids data storage on racial and ethnic 
origins.74 Nonetheless, estimates by the French High Council on Integration currently place 
the total French Muslim population, as defined by culture, between four and five million, the 
majority of which being of Algerian, Moroccan, or Tunisian descent.75 Following a decade of 
free circulation of Algerian Muslims between colonial Algeria and metropolitan France, 
immigration across the Mediterranean exploded during the Algerian War of Independence in 
the 1950s.  National policies of assimilation of North African immigrants rapidly changed to 
measures of control and mistrust, epitomized in statements by French leaders.  Maurice 
Bouges Maunory declared in 1958 the “indefectible belonging of the population of Algerian 
origin to the national community.”76 Maillard notes that the increasingly acrimonious 
relationship between the French population and the immigrant Muslim community laid the 
adversarial foundation for contemporary French-Muslim relations. 
“The Muslim community, therefore, was no longer part of the national community… 
The Muslims became heterogeneous in the double meaning of the word… it was a 
foreign body in the nation and it was composed of elements of a different nature.”77 
Ethnoreligious Mobilization 
Of critical importance to any understanding of French policies towards the Middle 
East and the greater Arab world is the growing socio-political role of Muslims within the 
French Republic and the community’s ever increasing lobbying power.  Analysis of the 
French Muslim population proves a complex research question, however, due to 
considerable religious, political, and sociological diversity within the Muslim populace.78 
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French scholars and politicians often use terminology such as Maghrebi, Muslim, Arab, and 
Beur interchangeably, a situation that, according to William Safran, detrimentally 
homogenizes a considerably diverse population.  While the majority of Muslims, meaning 
practitioners of Islam, are indeed Arab and can trace their ancestral lineage to the Maghrebi 
region of North Africa, France’s Muslim community also contains a considerable North 
African Berber contingent that adheres to its own specific cultural tradition separate from 
Arabs.79 Safran emphasizes that within the Arab population itself, one segment is 
considerably secular and has immersed itself fully into traditional French culture, while the 
other retains cultural ties to the country of origin.    
Like the French Muslim population, the Jewish community in France is also 
incredibly diverse, divided along cultural and religious lines.  A considerable segment can 
trace its French territorial ancestry to Roman times, while others moved to France as 
immigrants during the 19th and 20th centuries.  Consequently, several cultural traditions 
exists within the Jewish population, the two largest being Ashkenazi Jews, who migrated 
from Central and Eastern Europe, and the Sephardi, a community that migrated from the 
Iberian peninsula to France in order to escape the Inquisition during the 15 and 16th 
centuries.80 
Such diversity within the Muslim and Jewish communities of France renders any 
examination of their respective lobbying power quite difficult, due to the multitude of 
identities within each group that dilute any sense of collectivity.81 Safran argues, 
nonetheless, that both populations are similar in two critical aspects, enabling effective 
comparisons of their lobbying and electoral power.  First, each population is an 
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ethnoreligious group, in which no distinct separation between ethnicity and religion exists.  
Second, a detail that is critically important to a discussion of French foreign policy, each 
community has faced criticism from the greater French population concerning its full 
membership in La République Française. The latter distinction is threefold, due the fact that 
both communities differ from the traditional Christian norm in France, both are often not 
considered to rooted into French society due to a large number of immigrants, and, most 
importantly, both communities are often viewed as transnational, due to a considerable 
orientation towards relatives in foreign countries, such as Israel or Lebanon.82 
French Jews vs. the State 
In order to both project the rights of the Jewish community while also ensuring the 
Republican values of the Revolution., Napoleon I established the Jewish Consistory in 1808 
to represent the interests of French Jews in front of public authorities.  At present, over fifty 
Jewish organizations exist within France, representing all spectrums of the Jewish 
population including both mainstream and Zionist sectors.  Nearly all of the organizations 
have since pooled under the Conseil Représentatif des Institutions Juives de France (CRIF), 
which, despite its unofficial stature, continues to augment its visibility, notably after receiving 
an invitation to the Elysée Palace under the Pompidou presidency. 83 
Muslims in La République 
In a corresponding manner, French Muslims began to develop a diverse collection of 
independent organizations to represent their own interests throughout the latter half of the 
20th century, including the Union des Organisations Islamiques de France and the 
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Association des Etudiants Islamiques de France.  Parallel to the CRIF, an ethnoreligious 
“umbrella” association entitled the Conseil Représentatif des Musulmans de France was 
eventually established to coalesce both ethnic and religious interests of the Muslim 
population.84
Analogous to Napoleon’s establishment of the Jewish Consistory to fuse the Jewish 
community into mainstream French society, arguably in order to monitor its activity, the 
French government created the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman in 2003.  Serving as 
an “interlocutor” between the Muslim population and the French state, the long overdue yet 
considerably controversial CFCM includes representatives from seven Muslim federations 
and five of France’s largest mosques, as well as six independent “qualified individuals.”85 
Safran emphasizes that the CFCM was designed “not as a lobby but as a means of 
mainstreaming, i.e. westernizing, Islam and keeping an eye on Muslim activities,” creating a 
socio-political entity parallel to Napoleon’s concept of a Juif d’etat. Many in France have 
lambasted the creation of the CFCM over fears that it infringes on France’s lofted Loi de 
1901 separating church and state through a legitimization of Islam, leading potentially to the 
Islamisation of France rather than the Francisation of Islam.86 
Safran argues that both religious and secular Muslim groups have received equal 
mistrust in relationship to the French political establishment.  
”Unlike Muslim religious organizations, which are viewed with apprehension because 
of the alleged fundamentalism of Islam and its links with foreign countries, secular 
Muslim groups are regarded with equal distrust because of their frankly ethnic 
orientation.  In short, cultic Muslims threaten France’s secular ideology, while 
Muslims defined by ethnicity threaten France’s anti-communitarian Jacobinism.”87 
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Muslim and Jewish Lobbying 
Within the French framework, any reference to lobbying from an ethnic or religious 
perspective is frowned upon, which many outside of the Catholic or culturally French 
populations criticize as an effort to exclude minority voices.  Due to the mainstream nature of 
Catholicism within French society, efforts form the Catholic community to fight against 
issues such as abortion or birth control are not often categorized as “lobbying” due to 
adhesion with the ideologies and orientation of a large part of the political elite.  
Furthermore, as no French political parties are specifically tied to traditionally religious 
themes, such as a Christian Democratic Party for example, ethnoreligious groups in the 
French political theatre find themselves at a considerable disadvantage at election time. 88 
Congruent with the sweeping changes concerning French Middle East policy 
ushered in under the de Gaulle administration, political mobilization within Jewish and 
Muslim communities commenced during the 1960s due to a plethora of reasons.  Using as a 
precedent the re-ethnification tactics of Bretons, Basques, and Occitanians, French Jews 
began to assert their unique ethnoreligious place within France’s socio-political structure.89 
Safran related this re-ethnification to several factors, including increased concern over 
Israel’s security, the arrival of Jewish pied noirs from North Africa that exhibited no qualms 
about expressing their multifaceted identity, and an increase of seemingly anti-Semitic 
rhetoric stemming from all ends of the political spectrum, including de Gaulle himself.   
 Similarly, Muslims galvanized attention to their unique ethnoreligious identity during 
the same period, encouraged by increasing hostilities in the Middle East crisis and 
cemented through the growing socio-economic marginalization of Muslim communities.90 
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A dearth of ethnic or religious parties nevertheless complicated the ability of Jewish 
and Muslim communities to accumulate political power.  Most attempts by constituents of 
either side to establish a party based solely on ethnoreligious identity failed, exemplified in 
1997 when a Strasbourgois iman created the Parti des Musulmans de France.  Essentially 
created to elicit radical Islamic mobilization against Jewish interests rather than substantiate 
an electoral victory, the party receives less than one percent of the vote. 91
Nonetheless, parties on both ends of the political spectrum have slowly begun to 
acknowledge that ethnoreligious groups can no longer be ignored.  While the Jewish 
electoral vote is only two percent of the overall French voting population, a considerable 
“Jewish sensitivity” among politicians emerged on both ends of the spectrum.  Crises in the 
Middle East have exacerbated this awareness, and the Jewish community in particular 
witnessed a political about face within the French political establishment following the Six 
Day War.  Embraced by the Left during the first half of the 20th century due to its adherence 
to republican values and the maintenance of a separation between church and state, the 
Jewish community proved a considerable ally in French foreign policy towards the Middle 
East in the 1950s, when it ardently defended the interests of the nascent Jewish state.92 In 
the wake of Algerian independence and the Israel victory in the Six Day war, French 
politicians on the left and right embraced a considerably more anti-Israel foreign policy, and 
many viewed Jewish lobbying as a threatening representation of dual allegiance.  Portraying 
the increasing hostility on the Left towards Jewish lobbying, Pascal Boniface, director of the 
Institut des Relations Internationales et Strategiques and a member of the Parti Socialiste, 
emphatically stated that the left needed to abandon Jewish interests in favor of the Muslim 
community due to not only the significantly larger size of the Muslim electorate but also the 
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conflict between French pro-Arab foreign policy and the pro-Israel pressures of Jews.  
“There is no Jewish lobby… but there is a pro-Israel lobby that goes beyond the bounds of 
the Jewish community.”93
Political Realities 
At present, French governing bodies at national and regional levels involve dismal 
numbers of Muslim representatives. The French Assembly includes only two Muslims, out of 
the total 908 electoral representatives, and barely 2.4% of locally elected authorities are of 
North African origin.  Furthermore, a “Muslim vote” has yet to fully materialize within the 
French electoral arena.94 Oliver Roy argues that the idea of a Muslim vote is inane due to 
such diversity with the community, and Islam within France “has failed to supersede other 
identity patterns, social strategies, economic interests, and so on.”95 Stephanie Giry 
emphasizes that the 1.2 Muslims in France that are eligible to vote have traditionally 
displayed voting patterns no different to those of the greater French population, and that the 
only “distinct political trait” of the French Muslim community is its political disengagement.96 
More than twenty-three percent of naturalized Muslim immigrants are not registered to vote, 
which Giry connects to a lack of recognition among Muslim voters of their political rights as 
citizens.  Those that do vote have tended to display a tendency to vote with the Left out of 
concerns toward economic marginalization.  Among topics central to Muslim voting patterns 
are unemployment, social inequality, education, and the cost of living.97 Furthermore, elites 
within Muslim communities have shown no interest in establishing an Islamic Party or a 
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Muslim lobby.  Displaying the weak relationship between Muslim political action and 
lobbying, a Euro-Palestine list created in 2004 during the European Union Parliamentary 
Elections to advance the Palestine cause in Brussels and Strasbourg failed to receive even 
10% of the French vote, including areas dominated by Muslim communities. 98
Increasing Electoral Influence 
Electoral realities, however, are slowly changing, and increasing Muslim political 
mobilization may prove critical in defining French foreign and domestic policies as the first 
decade of the Twenty-First century comes to a close.  Many predictions indicate that over 
one-fourth of the French population will be Muslim by 2025, a trend that may eventually 
place non-Muslim Frenchmen in the minority.99 Furthermore, while the growing population 
of Muslim immigrants has traditionally encouraged xenophobic Frenchmen to embrace the 
anti-immigrant ideology of Jean Marie Le Pen’s far-right Front National, France’s Extrême 
Droite has ironically commenced a campaign to attract Muslim voters.   
 Timothy Savage emphasizes that many political observers have suggested that 
French and European far-right parties should begin to court Muslim voters, in a similar 
fashion to the U.S. Republican Party’s growing relationship with the Hispanic-American 
population.  The Front National is currently proving remarkably popular with various sectors 
of the Muslim immigrant community due to its support for Arab and Islamic causes abroad 
and the party’s consistent anti-American, anti-Israel stance.100 Michel Gurfinkiel notes that, 
“Islamic leaders in France are advising their followers to act as ‘democratic and responsible 
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citizens,’ i.e., to register as prospective voters and to enter as full-fledged activists into all 
major political parties, either right of left…. a reconstructed, Muslim-friendly National Front 
stands a good chance to win many of them.”101 Considering Le Pen’s xenophobic, Euro-
skeptic, and isolationist platform, an electoral victory for the Front National, due in part to 
increasing support from France’s large Muslim community, would undoubtedly have far-
reaching effects on Paris’s traditional foreign policy framework.   
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Through an examination of the diplomatic positions undertaken by the first five 
Presidential administrations of the French Fifth Republic concerning the Middle East, this 
analysis has emphasized that Paris’s polices have proven remarkably consistent since 
Charles de Gaulle’s tenure at the Elysée Palace due to a continued adherence to traditional 
Gaullist diplomatic principles.  While varying personalities and domestic political orientations 
have resulted in slight divergences, each of the five Presidents remained diligent in the 
continued proliferation of the Gaullist foreign policy framework, one that demands a 
diplomatically independent yet engaged role for France within the international arena.  
Stemming from France’s historical role in the region, the Middle East has remained a 
cornerstone of Paris’s diplomatic agenda, and the Fifth Republic’s constitutional structures 
have enabled the Elysée Palace to maneuver relatively autonomously from domestic socio-
political and lobbying forces.    
Nevertheless, domestic pressures are becoming ever more inescapable, and the 
increasing electoral strength of French Muslim communities may have considerable effects 
on Paris’s traditional diplomatic priorities, as well as on international perceptions of the 
French Republic’s long-exalted values.  A report published by the International Crisis Group 
conjectured that continued political and economic marginalization of Muslim communities 
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could foster further violence, as displayed in November 2005, and religious radicalism.102 
Consequently, the already increasing presence of Salafi groups in French suburbs, which 
promote stringent scriptural adherence and encourage Muslims to disengage from Western 
society, could very well escalate into a potentially disastrous situation.103 Stephanie Giry 
notes that the French government therefore faces a conundrum: “Having feared that the 
communal bond of French Muslims might somehow become a political problem, French 
politicians may now have reason to worry about how individualism, when taken to an 
extreme, might lead to anomie or radicalism.”104 Olivier Guitta likewise emphasizes that 
increasing domestic pressures may in fact force French leaders to strengthen Paris’s 
relationship with various Middle Eastern despots, thereby tarnishing France’s cherished 
democratic self-image. 
“Growing Islamist pressure inside France may…. push Chirac and his successors to 
pursue an even more pro-Arab policy….The legacy of the Chirac doctrine….may not 
be the French grandeur that Chirac and his allies seek, but rather a reputation for 
cynicism, hostility to democracy and reform, and association with the worst excesses 
of Middle Eastern society.” 105 
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